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This article investigates public sector talent management schemes in Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore. It offers a framework to make such comparisons, 
which allow for better understanding of the values and contextual factors 
related to talent management. The three countries are found to have 
comparable names of talent management schemes. They are such as 
scholarship schemes, training schemes for high-potential officers, and special 
pay scale for those identified as a talent.  A close look at these schemes reveals 
that there are also many differences. We identify some key factors that can 
possibly explain the variations. They are such as: the differing definitions of 
talent; the structure and scope of authority of the responsible agencies; the 
level of flexibility of incentive systems; and the differing performance appraisal 
systems in each country. The three cases illustrate the need for policy-makers 
to be fully aware of the value they are hoping to enhance for the public service 
and the governance structures that they are operating in. At the end, the paper 
offers a spectrum of exclusive and inclusive approaches to talent management 
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INTRODUCTION  
Governments are constantly striving to recruit, retain, reward and develop its 
pool of public employees. They face fierce competition with the higher paying 
private sector. When governments cannot recruit and retain capable individuals 
it adds to the vicious cycle of weak governance. With the widespread practice 
of performance management in the public sector, the ‘war for talent’ is the top 
agenda for civil services around the world (Kim 2008; Van Dijk 2009).  
 
For bureaucracies to be staffed by the best talented people, governments 
have intervened by establishing a variety of schemes1. These schemes are 
such as the United States’ Senior Executive Service, the U.K.’s Fast Stream, 
South Korea’s Senior Civil Service, Singapore’s Administrative Services, 
Thailand’s High Potential Performers, and Malaysia’s Administrative and 
Diplomatic schemes. In this paper these policies are called talent management 
schemes. Such schemes have said to be successful in some contexts and less 
successful in others. Despite good intentions, such schemes have been 
perceived as inequitable and unfair. Also such schemes can distort civil 
servants behavior in different ways and can also change organizational culture.  
 
Basic public sector human resource management textbooks (e.g. Berman 
et al. 2010; Pynes 2009) do not adequately discuss these schemes and 
surrounding issues. Textbooks on talent management in general (e.g. Berger 
and Beger 2011; Cappelli 2008) do not explicitly cover the public sector. To fill 
this gap in the literature, this paper initiates a systematic comparative research 
on public sector talent management schemes. The intention is to provide 
scholars and practitioners a framework of thinking so better talent management 
policies can be developed. It contributes to new knowledge not only on how the 
talent pool is managed in the public sector but also on factors that explain the 
variations in different countries. For the first time, factors pertaining to 
competing values in talent identification and the limitations of institutional 
context are explicitly studied.  
                                                        
1 In this article the word ‘scheme’ is used in a neutral way. Similar words are ‘strategy’, ‘plan’ and 
‘program’.  
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This paper is organized as follows: The first section, after offering 
definitions, is the description of the schemes in Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. The second section provides explanations on how the schemes 
compare across jurisdictions and what factors can explain the variations. Based 
on the analysis, the third section discusses implications for policy making in this 
area. The last section offers ideas for future research on this topic.  
 
STUDIES OF TALENT MANAGEMENT 
‘The war for talent’ in the private sector was exposed in 1997 when McKinsey 
published their now-famous report proclaiming that better talent is worth fighting 
for and that talent is the critical driver of corporate performance. McKinsey 
replaced ‘the old reality’ that people need companies to be ‘the new reality’, that 
companies need people (Beechler and Woodward 2009). Authors of the 
McKinsey report, Michaels et al (2001), insist that this challenge would continue 
for at least the next twenty years. This assertion is absolutely true for the public 
sector as well (Kim 2008; Van Dijk 2009). In many countries the public sector 
is no longer the most sought after employer. For example according to the 
Graduate Barometer surveys in 2011 National Health Service (NHS) was the 
most sought after employer of graduates in the U.K. but in 2012 the top position 
went to Google and NHS came in fourth (The Guardian 2012/13). Kim (2008) 
advocated for governments to realize that they are in this war for talent.  
 
The word talent can be defined as ‘the sum of a person's abilities… his or 
her intrinsic gifts, skills, knowledge, experience, intelligence, judgment, attitude, 
character and drive. It also includes his or her ability to learn and grow’ 
(Michaels et al. 2001: xii). Ulrich takes a more holistic view to define talent as a 
combination of competence, commitment, and contribution (Ulrich 2006). 
‘Competence deals with the head (being able), commitment with the hands and 
feet (being there), contribution with the heart (simply being)’ (Ulrich 2006: 32). 
 
Talent management can be defined as ‘the systematic attraction, 
identification, development, engagement/retention and deployment of those 
individuals with high potential who are of particular value to an organization’ 
(CIPD 2006). Some examples of the frameworks used to study talent 
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management include the competency approach (Bhatta 2001); self-selection 
approach (Delfgaauw and Dur 2010); and the talent management approach 
(Frank and Taylor 2004; Lewis and Heckman 2006). Another strand of literature 
focuses on the prescription of how to manage talent (e.g. Berger and Berger 
2010; Pilbeam and Corbridge 2010; Cappelli 2008; Makela, Bjorkman and 
Ehrnrooth 2010). One most recent and comprehensive study of talent 
management in the private sector argues for strategies to overcome 
‘global talent management’ challenges (Tarique and Schuler 2010; Schullion 
and Collings 2011). These works are of enormous value but a great gap of 
knowledge still exists for the public sector. 
 
This topic is also of great concern for the nonprofit sector but 
academics have given it little attention. Usually the nonprofit sector 
suffers from lower salary scales, lack of organizational infrastructure and 
potentially is less appealing to young people who are entering the work 
force. However, in many ways, nonprofits are tackling talent shortage 
problems the same way as the public sector, which includes strategic 
human resources management (Guo et al. 2011), creating good 
performance management processes, and recognizing talent in material 
and non-material ways (Accenture, 2011). 
 
The existing studies on talent management in the public sector have been 
limited to surveys of what is done in practice. For example Pollitt and Geert 
(2004) studied how the top civil servants and ‘highfliers’ of seven European 
countries were trained. Most studies have focused on single-country cases. For 
example Duggett (2001) studied four decades of the British civil service training 
institute and their priorities and Bhatnagar (2007) studied talent management 
of an Indian public agency. And from their study of various public organizations 
in the U.K. Devine and Powell (2008) concluded that there were six strategic 
perspectives of talent management:  
 
1) Competitive perspective – give what talented people want otherwise they 
will be poached;  
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2) Process perspective – managing talent is part of the everyday 
organizational life;  
3) HR perspective – match right people with right job, strong ownership of 
HR team;  
4) Developmental perspective – accelerated development paths for talented 
people;  
5) Cultural perspective – talent management as a mindset;  
6) Change management perspective – talent management is a driver of 
change.  
 
Both private and public organizations struggle to identify who are the right 
‘talents’ to be managed. In general there are two approaches. First is an 
‘exclusive’ or ‘elite high-potential’ mode of talent management that is 
‘characterized by a concentration of those in the one or two segments (or talent 
‘pools’) of the workforce who are either at the top or who are identified as having 
the potential to get to the top by demonstrating high levels of potential or 
performance’ (CIPD 2006: 2). These top-level employees are the ‘best and 
brightest’. Conversely, the second approach is an ‘inclusive’ or ‘whole 
workforce’ mode which ‘recognizes that there are various key positions to fill in 
any organization as well as future pipeline for the appropriate skills to fill all 
these positions’ (CPID 2006: 3). This definition takes talent as a synonym for 
the entire workforce. Michaels et al. (2001) found from their study of more than 
120 companies that the better strategy is to invest in A players, develop B 
players, and act decisively on C players; in other words, a focus on the entire 
organization. 
 
While it is difficult to define and manage talent, it is also very challenging to 
integrate talent management with organizational performance management. A 
limited number of studies explicitly link human resource management to 
performance management, usually under the rubrics of strategic human 
resource management (SHRM). The idea is that performance appraisal 
systems for human resources are part of the larger performance management 
system. And performance appraisal systems play a very important role in 
identifying, rewarding, and tracking development of talent in the organization. 
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Thus, it is an integral part of any talent management scheme (Durham and 
Bartol 2004; Hiltrop 1999; National Research Council 1991; Ingraham 1993; 
Marsden and French 1998). 
 
Drawing from the aforementioned exiting literature, aside from 
describing the specific talent management schemes in the three country 
cases, this study seeks to explore factors that explain the variations 
among the schemes. The research questions are the following: 1) what 
kinds of schemes are in place; 2) how do these governments define talent 
– exclusive or inclusive; 3) why are the schemes different; 4) what can we 
learn from the comparative study. The authors took an inductive 
approach by first thoroughly cross-examining the three systems and 
allowing for possible explanatory factors to emerge from the cases. There 
are two groups of factors. The first group consists of the values that 
influence the intention and design of talent management schemes. It 
leads to differing definitions of talent that are used by governments, 
which in turn leads to differing target groups and training objectives.  The 
second has to do with existing institutions including their structure, 
scope of authority, and salary structures, which has led to varying talent 
management approaches. The following section offers an explanation on 
how the study was conducted.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The case study comparative approach is used. A comparative method is defined as 
the systematic analysis of a small number of cases (Lijphart 1971; Bryman 2008). 
Rigorous comparative case studies do offer rich understanding of certain phenomena 
(Heady 2001). For decades, public administration scholars have argued that the 
scientific method is unavoidably comparative in nature (Dahl 1947; Collier 1991; 
Jreisat 2012).  
 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand were selected for comparative analysis. 
The countries are in close proximity to one another in the Southeast Asian 
region, each of them possesses distinct economic strengths, political systems 
and regimes, as well as human resource developments. Most importantly these 
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countries have been experimenting with a variety of talent management 
schemes for at least 10 years. The paper draws on data generated from 
different talent management schemes that are introduced and implemented for 
the past five years. Schemes in statutory boards, quasi-government 
organizations and uniform groups are not considered in the study. The three 
groups of schemes are 1) government sponsored scholarships; 2) special 
service schemes; and 3) high potential schemes. 
 
The research output described in the following sections was derived from 
over 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews - each averaging 90 minutes - 
conducted from November 2010 to February 2012. All the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed in accordance to the topics. The respondents were 
public service officers from various relevant agencies. In Singapore, interviews 
were conducted with representatives from the Public Service Division (PSD) 
and the Civil Service College (CSC). In Malaysia the agencies were Jabatan 
Perkhidmatan Awam or the Public Service Department of Malaysia (JPA), the 
National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), TalentCorp, the Malaysian 
Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), and 
Performance Management on Delivery Units (Permandu).  And in Thailand the 
interviewees were from the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) and the 
Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). Secondary data 
from the official documentation, websites, press releases and other publicly 
available sources were also used to support the research findings. In addition 
secondary evaluation reports of the schemes were also drawn upon. This mix 
of data gathering allowed for results to be triangulated. The next section 
describes the schemes that are in place.  
 
TALENT MANAGEMENT SCHEMES  
Table 1 below shows the list of talent management schemes that were 
identified.  The answers are grouped into three stages of talent management: 
recruitment, development, and retention. All three countries have bonded 
scholarship schemes to attract very young candidates at the highschool level. 
They all have schemes to develop high performers further and accelerate 
promotion processes. And they all use extra monetary incentives as a tool for 
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retention of top performers. A close look at these schemes reveals that there 
are stark variations on how these schemes are designed and implemented, 
leading to varying levels of effectiveness. The key schemes can be described 





The Singapore public sector employs some 127,000 officers in 15 ministries 
and more than 50 independent government agencies with about 76,000 officers 
working in the ministries, which make up the civil service. The three agencies 
that oversee the talent management are the Public Service Commission (PSC), 
PSD, and CSC. There are four key talent management schemes in Singapore.  
 
1. Pre-Service Scholarships 
The Singapore Government believes that offering pre-service scholarships is the best 
way to attract the best and brightest young men and women to serve the government. 
Since 1962, about 60 scholarships administered by PSC are granted annually to 
ensure talents in the succession pipeline. PSC scholarships are targeted at recruitment 
for critical high-level public service functions (Neo and Chen 2007). There are a variety 
of scholarships with no stringent restrictions in the field of study designed to cater to 
candidates with different abilities and interests and no quota on the number of 
scholarships to be awarded. 
 
Candidates are assessed primarily, based on their high school academic results; 
leadership potential and the desire to serve the public are of secondary criteria. The 
candidates go through a few rounds of interviews and psychometric tests administered 
mainly by PSC. Scholars have to serve a 5 to 7 year bond to the government upon 
return and will be deployed throughout the Service through a 4-year Management 
Associate scheme before they are considered for the Administrative Service. Aside 
from the above, the Singapore government also binds those who receive scholarships 
from outside to work for the Singapore government. So for example those on the 
Japanese Monbusho scholarship are also obliged to serve the Singapore public sector 
upon their return.  
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2. Management Associate Program (MAP) 
MAP is a career development program for scholars from 2002, which would 
give scholars a management track career in the Civil Service upon their 
graduation. The higher-tier PSC administered scholarship holders will 
automatically join the MAP and in-service officers, with less than two years of 
experience, could also be nominated for the program. There are also open 
recruitments to attract mid-career individuals to join the scheme. 
 
The Management Officer (MA) typically spends the first two years in a 
parent Ministry to gain professional experience. This is followed by an external 
posting with a different Ministry to an Administrative Service-type job for two 
years. During this period, MAs will be given opportunities to participate in a wide 
range of training and development programsto broaden their perspectives on 
public sector issues and deepen their managerial and leadership capabilities. 
It also includes a three-month Foundation Course, which covers visits to 
ASEAN countries, cross-ministry project teams, policy forums, overseas 
conferences and study visits. 
 
3. Administrative Service (AS) 
This scheme marks the crème’ of the crop of Singapore’s civil servants. PSC 
appoints these Administrative Officers (AOs) while PSD manages their 
deployment designations and career paths. Although scholars only account for 
10 percent to 15 percent of all division one officers, the majority of officers in 
the AS are scholars. At the end of the 4-year MAP, the MAs would be 
interviewed for entry into the Administrative Service. 
 
AOs are responsible for developing and implementing national policies in 
consultation with the political leadership. Apart from formal training, AOs are 
also exposed to a wide variety of jobs to maximize their experience and 
expertise, including working in private sector companies. Milestone programs 
are planned for AOs at every stage of their careers and are pushed to take 
leadership roles very early. Thus, directors of departments in Singapore are 
relatively young at the age of mid 30s when compared to Malaysia and 
Thailand. The top performing AOs would take up permanent secretary positions 
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in the end. By their mid-30s if the AOs estimated potential is of less than deputy 
secretary of the ministry, he or she would usually be asked to leave the service 
(Neo & Chen, 2007). 
 
AOs are paid on a much higher pay scale than normal civil servants. The 
annual salary of an Administrative Officer in the entry Superscale grade is 
pegged to the annual salary of the 15th top earner aged 32 years belonging to 
the top six professions. In 2008, this was $398,000 per year SGD (Public 
Service Division, 2007).  Currently there are about 200 AOs in the service.  
 
4. High Potential Program (HiPo) 
The High Potential (HiPo) Program is for in-service officers.. The objective is to develop 
broader leadership capabilities across the civil service. As part of the Program, the 
officers will have opportunities to attend milestone-training programs, participate in 
inter-agency project teams, be posted to an external ministry or organization, attend 
forums on leadership and governance, and undertake challenging assignments. 
Typically, officers would need to have at least 2 years of service before they are 
nominated for the program. There are no clear criteria that can be found in the public 




In Malaysia there are 1,253,026 public servants serving in 722 government 
agencies (including local authorities) as at 2009.  The civil service is broadly 
grouped into the common-user and non-common-user groups under 276 
schemes of services. There are about 70,000 officers under the common-user 
group as at 2011 (including the Administrative and Diplomatic Services). JPA 
is responsible for the management of recruitment, placement, transfer and 
training of the common-user group. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam (SPA) 
or Public Service Commission oversees the policies of appointment, 
confirmation of service, conferment into pension status, promotion, transfer and 




1. Pre-Service Scholarships 
Like Singapore, the Malaysian government also offers pre-service 
scholarships. The JPA scholarship is one of the most sought after public 
scholarships in Malaysia for students to pursue tertiary education abroad. 
Successful recipients undergo a pre-university program or prepare for pre-
university examination such as A-levels2 at a local college. Upon completion 
he/she will then apply individually to a university, taken from a list of universities 
in the country agreed upon in the scholarship agreement. High concentration 
of scholarships offered is for medical subjects. 
 
As shown in table 2 the JPA overseas scholarships are allocated based on 
four categories namely Academic Excellence, Ethnic Population, Bumiputra 





JPA overseas scholarship is career-specific as the scholarship is tied to the 
field of study and it is also student-specific, merit-based and need-based. At 
the end of the course, the scholar is bonded to serve the government for a 
period ranging from 6 to 10 years. The Talent Acceleration in Public Service 
(TAPS) program led by JPA with the Razak School of Government (RSOG) and 
TalentCorp aim to channel and prepare the best and brightest from among the 
JPA scholars into the public service. Under this program, top scholars would be 
selected to work on high priority public policy issues and assigned to senior 
officers who act as mentors. The selected scholars will be offered a two-year 
contract and high performers fast-tracked into the civil service. 
 
However the availability of job position in the government is not guaranteed, 
if the scholar is not able to secure a job within a year upon return, she is allowed 
to apply for employment in the private sector. Therefore JPA has recently 
                                                        
2 A-levels is a British model that refers to the last 2 years of secondary education prior to 
university. Countries that adopt the British system would have A-level examinations 
administered across the country on annual bases.  
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initiated the Scholarship Talent Attraction and Retention (STAR) program, 
which is a joint initiative between JPA with TalentCorp. STAR enables scholars 
who are interested to work in the private sector to service their bonds by 
working in leading companies (mostly government linked companies). These 
companies are pre-identified by the government to be in the key sectors to drive 
economic growth. Therefore the country as a whole optimizes on this group of 
talent by ensuring that they are retained and nurtured to contribute to the priority 
areas of the Malaysian economy. 
 
2. Administrative and Diplomatic Scheme (PTD) 
The PTD scheme is the earliest 'premier' public service track since 1904. There 
are currently about 9,000 to 10,000 PTD officers. The job scope is very wide 
and applied to the various levels and departments. Officers are located in the 
ministries, federal departments, local governments and statutory bodies and 
assume main leadership roles (Chin, 2011). They also have opportunities to be 
transferred to different organizations as well as seconded to private 
organizations. 
 
Unlike Singapore, application to the scheme is open to all and candidates 
have to go through numerous exams and assessments. A centralized e-
recruitment method was implemented by PCS to screen the candidates. 
Candidates need to undergo 4 processes: early screening; PTD’s IQ 
examination; competency assessment; and lastly interview. After being 
appointed, the recruit will go through a 10-day foundation course (Manaf, 2011). 
Upon completion, they will be informed of their job assignments and agencies 
to be attached to. After undergoing a 6-month on-the-job training and another 
6-month diploma course in Public Administration at INTAN, they will be officially 
appointed as PTD officers. 
 
3. High Performing Officer Scheme 
High performing in-service officers who have the capacity to assume higher 
leadership roles are also identified based on the annual performance appraisal 
process. Identified officers are given more challenging projects, assignments 
or send for prime postings. They can also be offered study sponsorships for 
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higher education at the master or doctoral level. However there is no explicit 
roadmap for this group of officers and they are not guaranteed for higher 
positions upon completion of their studies or assignments. 
 
Thailand 
Thailand’s civilian civil service workforce consists of about 2 million personnel, 
working in 19 ministries and 147 departments (Sivaraks 2011). Of this number, 
about 365,000 are ordinary civil servants under the jurisdiction of OCSC.  
OCSC is responsible to oversee and develop competency of civil service 
officials. Its specific mandate is to provide proposals to the cabinet on HR 
issues; supervising and monitoring HR management by ministries; and 
managing government scholarships. It is directly accountable to the Prime 
Minister. Another agency is OPDC, which is mainly responsible for performance 
management systems and some human resource development. Currently there 
are four talent management schemes in the Thai civil service.  
 
1. Pre-Service Scholarship 
There are several types of government scholarships available to high school 
students and bachelor degree holders. The two main types are: the specific 
ministry bonded scholarship; and the non-specific ministry scholarship. For the 
former, scholars know exactly where they are bonded to upon graduation, while 
the latter the scholar chooses where they wish to serve after they return from 
their studies. Provided that there are openings, their wish is often granted. 
There are cases where scholars return without a proper agency to land causing 
frustration among scholars due to the mismatch of acquired skills and agency’s 
needs. About 300 scholars are selected each year (Sivaraks 2011).  
 
Contrary to the Singapore scholarship scheme, these scholars are not put 
on a special track nor are they provided different incentive structures to excel 
in the system but they are bonded.  To serve the time, the scholars must serve 
twice the amount of time taken to study. OCSC is also experimenting with new 
types of scholarships such the Public Sector Innovation Scholarship introduced 
in 2007. It aims to attract oversea Thai students who are working innovations. 
These scholars are eligible for performance-based pay upon signing a contract 
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with OCSC. Another scholarship, started just in 2010, is aimed at first class 
honors of university students.  
 
2. Public Sector Executive Development Program (PSED) 
The PSED is led by OPDC. It aims to attract excellent individuals to join the 
public sector at mid-level entry point. There are approximately 40-60 
participants in each cohort. The participants go through not only intensive 
theory or classroom-based training on public management and leadership, but 
they are also trained in practice by being seconded to three groups of public-
sector leaders and one private-sector leader for about two years. The program 
offers a mentorship system exposing participants to mentors, coaches and 
advisors, whom all play different roles in the training program. The objectives 
of the scheme are: to develop highly effective change agents who have the 
abilities to be visionary thinker, developer, planner and operator; to deploy 
change agents to the strategic units and drive their strategic plans into action. 
 
3. High Potential Performance System (HiPPS)  
Led by OCSC, the HiPPS scheme has three objectives: 1) attract, maintain and 
motivate high potential individuals within the civil service; 2) continuously and 
systematically develop them; 3) prepare a sufficient number of highly qualified, 
experienced and well-rounded leaders for senior levels. Initially since 2003, the 
program focused primarily on improving and implementing a system for 
selecting high potentials and for creating the Experience Accumulation 
Framework (EAF) which is a roadmap of cross-functional work assignments 
and mile-stones to support career growth and acceleration. The supervisors in 
the bureaus and agencies have to identify high performing individuals to take 
part in the program. 
 
In 2006, the HiPPS program was extended to all civil service departments, 
which included training for developing key leadership skills as well as coaching 
skills for the mentors assigned to each HiPPS individuals. Out of the total 150 
bureaus, 100 bureaus have opted to participate and they sign an MOU with the 
OCSC and develop a clear EAF for the candidate. Candidates must perform 
outstanding throughout to receive higher pay by about 1 percent of his/her usual 
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monthly income. Candidates from PSED can enter the public sector and 
become HiPPS. In the first few years, this was automatic; however from 2011 
onwards they need to pass the English exam, making it more difficult for PSED 
graduates to be identified as high performers from the start of their public office 
careers.  
 
4. New Wave Leadership Development Program 
The New Wave Leadership Development Program is a one-month training 
program for mid-level bureaucrats. Based on interviews, the intent is to 
replicate the MAP scheme in Singapore. The stated objective is to promote a 




Using the typology by Devine and Powell (2008) table 3 above compares 
the differing perspectives that each of the three governments has taken to 
manage their talent pool. Singapore takes a more competitive perspective by 
highly remunerating and creating fast track career paths for their top talents in 
the civil service. It also takes a more exclusive approach than the other two 
countries by targeting academically successful individuals and giving them 
priorities in tasks and training. In Singapore the scholarship system is tightly 
connected to grooming individuals to become part of the elite civil service that 
work between politicians and mainstream civil servants (as noted that majority 
of AOs are made up of scholars). Compared to the other two countries 
Singapore has produced an elite class of about 200 Administrative officers. 
While in Thailand and more so in Malaysia the goal is broader:  to attract 
academically strong individuals to the public sector but not necessarily 
grooming them to be the elites of the bureaucracy. 
 
Malaysia takes a process perspective and more inclusive approach than 
Singapore. Its scholarships are distributed based on other factors aside from 
academic achievements such as ethnicity and economic status. There is no 
concentration of power among a small group of elite civil servants because the 
number of PTD is very large at about 9,000 at any one time and they are not 
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paid extraordinarily higher than normal civil servants. In Singapore upon 
completion of studies, the scholars are guaranteed a position in the service 
while in Malaysia and Thailand, scholars might not necessarily be offered a 
position right away, contributing to difficulties in finding a suitable position. 
Recognizing this limitation, Malaysia has accepted the goal of using 
government scholarships to build human capital for the private sector and so 
allow scholars to serve their bonds in designated private companies. 
 
Among the three countries, Thailand takes the least exclusive approach. Its 
schemes are concentrated in the hands of only two agencies that actually have 
less power than before as human resources management has been gradually 
decentralized to the line ministries. It does not have special tracks and training 
for scholars. The HiPPS scheme, which aims to retain in-service talent, has 
very few uptakes of less than 400 people, whereas the aim is over 5,000 
people. The PSED scheme, which aims to train new talent, also does not 
provide a clear career track for the graduates. Thus, compared to Singapore 
and Malaysia, Thailand follows the HR and some developmental perspective 
and definitely not the competitive perspective.  
 
COMPETING VALUES 
The three Asian cases show that the definition of talent and the approach to 
talent management are influenced by three sets of competing managerial 
values: a) education vs. equity based merit selection processes; b) exclusive 
vs. inclusive approaches; and c) competency vs. performance based 
appraisals.   
 
Education vs. Equity Based Merit 
Most countries use merit as the foundation of staffing in the public service. One 
important element in the recruitment and selection process that result in merit-
based appointments is that the process must be transparent and fair, 
incorporates the principles of equity (equal opportunity) to ensure that the most 
capable person is selected as well as the right of every individual to be given 
fair consideration for any job for which they are skilled and qualified.  The three 
countries clearly have systematic and transparent selection process, i.e. 
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Singapore’s stringent scrutiny of candidates’ educational background and 
psychometric assessments, Malaysia and Thailand’s stringent entry tests and 
examinations, and the final decision is determined by panel interviews. 
Although the procedures are similar, the three countries put different weighting 
on education and equity considerations. 
 
The three principles that Singapore uses in the talent management strategy 
are: get the best people in; give them challenging work and pay them well (Neo 
and Chen 2007: 322). As we have described earlier, Singapore is focused on 
getting the best and brightest (based on academic results) into the service by 
offering them full-fledged pre-service scholarships and promising future career 
prospects in the public service, even ultimately grooming them into future 
leaders. The meritocratic approach of recruiting the best and brightest scholars 
is not so much based on the equity principle as one respondent pointed out, 
‘The government uses a mass network approach whereby they will approach 
specific junior colleges for the name lists of top maybe 20 percent students and 
administer a test.’  
 
Potential candidates are pre-identified based on the scores and are invited 
to sit for a special test which includes psychological and IQ assessments. 
These students will subsequently apply for the scholarships based on their 
preliminary A-level examination results. Candidates are therefore assessed 
firstly, based on their high school academic results, leadership potential and 
the desire to serve the public are of secondary criterions.  
 
In Malaysia, besides the educational background of the candidate, other 
factors, such as ethnicity and income level, are also considered, forming 80 
percent of the evaluation weighting. Although the intention is noble as it seeks 
to achieve representativeness in the population of the community, it also invites 
criticism of race favoritism. The majority of scholarship recipients are Malays. It 
is precisely because of the disagreement on these affirmative action policies 
that Singapore, when separated from Malaysia in 1965, decided to use 
meritocracy based on education as the basis for its public sector.  
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Compared to Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand follows merit principles that 
include neutrality, equality, fairness, and competence (Sivaraks 2011). 
Scholarships are open to all and as there is no standard national examination, 
candidates are required to sit for standard entry examinations, therefore 
providing fair opportunities for all who are interested and qualified, disregarding 
past academic achievements and ethnicity. The downside is that the entry 
exams are not effective tools to attract highly talented people (Interview with 
OCSC official, February 2012).  
 
Emphasizing too much on education and too much on equity (or affirmative 
action) can weaken the merit-based principle. Whilst emphasizing only on 
equality without a target group, like in Thailand, is also not an effective 
approach to attract talent. These are differing trade-offs between values that 
governments must choose and balance.  
 
Exclusive vs. Inclusive Approaches to Talent Identification 
The three cases illustrate varying degrees of the exclusive strategy, whereby 
milestone development opportunities, exposure to high profile projects or 
mentorships are being offered to a selected group of employees. Singapore is 
the most exclusive and Thailand is the least. In Singapore, talent development 
schemes are usually reserved for scholars upon their return. On one hand, one 
can say that Singapore’s strategy is highly focused, but we can also say that 
Singapore defines talent more narrowly than Thailand and Malaysia, by 
focusing on the best talent and not really on potential talent and late bloomers. 
Scholars in Malaysia and Thailand are not specifically identified as talents when 
they enter the service; they usually end up blending with the rest of the work 
force. In fact, in Malaysia, returning scholars are not guaranteed jobs and some 
would even end up working in the private sector. In addition, the recruitment of 
other pre-service talent management schemes in Malaysia and Thailand are 
based on self-application process. In Malaysia, the talent management strategy 
encompasses ‘beneficial to the country’ approach and thus scholars are placed 
in priority areas in the private sector as well as public sector. 
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An exclusive approach is a double-edged sword; it can de-motivate people 
not identified as talent and can breed cynicism about the mechanisms for 
identifying those who are talented. Through the reverse Pygmalion effect, 
employees who perceive themselves as being in an inequitable scenario will 
attempt to reduce the inequity either by distorting inputs and or outcomes 
psychologically, directly altering inputs and or outputs or by quitting the 
organization. On the other hand, an inclusive approach might diffuse the value 
of talent management when efforts are made to manage human resources at 
all levels such as the case of Thailand. Governments need to have a strategic 
logic for talent management and it should not only be about filling skill shortages 
(Van Dijk 2009). In short, these two values require balancing by governments.  
 
According to Cappelli (2008), talent can be made or hired. Besides 
development for these new recruits, a small group of selected in-service officers 
in the three countries are also recommended for similar fast track programs. In 
Singapore and Malaysia, the selection criteria of High Potential officers is not 
as transparent and clear, their career progression is not as well-developed as 
their scholar peers. The scheme is implicit and as respondents in both countries 
pointed out ‘They don’t even know they have been identified as High Potentials 
until they were asked to attend certain courses’ (Interview with a Malaysian 
official, February 2012). 
 
In Thailand, the HiPPS scheme catered for the high potential in-service 
officers has a clearer roadmap which included training for developing key 
leadership skills as well as coaching skills for the mentors assigned to each 
HiPPS individuals. The scheme currently falls short of the original target 
because officers do not see the benefit and in some cases fear that they will be 
burdened by more and harder tasks (Sadangharn  2010). This is also true of 
the implicit high potential scheme in Singapore. Officers fear of added 
responsibilities with no apparent promise of career prospects.  
 
Competency vs. Performance Based Appraisal 
All employees desire to be treated fairly as determined by the rewards they 
receive compared to others in the organization and by how the organization 
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come to the decision concerning the reward. From an employee’s perspective, 
fair procedures may be in place but it is the practice of fairness by supervisors 
that demonstrates whether justice actually occurs or not. There are two 
approaches to ensure fairness, one is to judge a person by their competencies 
and the other is to look at their actual performance.  
 
As it is focused on an exclusive approach to talent management, Singapore 
has chosen to reward its talent highly based on both competency and 
performance. It has implemented performance bonuses for all public sector 
employees since the year 2000 and continues to fine-tune the remuneration 
scale to stay competitive with the private sector.  The public service in Malaysia 
has also moved away from the seniority-based system and is currently 
operating on a performance-based system which applies throughout the 
service. The fixed pay increment structure is determined by officers’ 
performance. The maximum pay increment is 3 percent of the vertical salary 
movement and two percent for diagonal progression (Manaf 2011). Although 
there is no performance-based bonus payout, promotion is determined by the 
officer’s performance. Thailand has also begun to differentiate pay for certain 
groups of people such as those in the HiPPS scheme, who can receive 1 
percent higher pay than their peers. But the impact is very minimal at the 
moment.  
 
Of the three countries, Singapore has the clearest performance appraisal 
system. Their system runs on a quota-based bell curve. Top performers make 
up about 15 percent of the distribution curve, 80 percent will be rated as 
developing contributor or average, and the rest of the 5 percent will be the poor 
performers. There are two components, the reporting system and the ranking 
system. The main assessment criteria for the reporting system are personal 
performance targets and trait-based criteria or competencies. The ranking 
system also has two components: performance ranking and potential ranking. 
The potential ranking component is largely determined by individual’s Currently 
Estimated Potential (CEP) score, which is based on competencies such as 
educational merits, intellectual and leadership qualities. Hence AOs are usually 
rated with higher CEP scores and will be exposed to high profile projects. 
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The caveat for using both approaches is that AOs will perform better and be 
promoted faster than the rest of the officers. This implies that AOs will become 
top leaders at relatively young age while experienced non-AOs are lagging 
behind. This case illustrates that competencies determine the tasks given and 
thus provides opportunities to achieve higher performance. Therefore it is 
misleading to divide the two approaches. They are interconnected in practice 
and they should be. But there should also be similar opportunities for other 
employees who are non-scholars too. This would be the case if the government 
takes the inclusive approach.  
 
At one time Malaysia accelerated promotion to fill up position gaps. PTD 
officers were promoted too quickly to assume leadership positions without the 
required experience. To prevent the same mistake, JPA is currently looking into 
designing a development roadmap for the PTD officers. At the end of the day, 
compared to Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand still values seniority and 
experience when it comes to choosing its leaders. Among the three cases, 
Thailand has a comparatively weak performance system. This impedes the 
ability to reward talents fairly. Using seniority as criteria are objective but it 
surely will not help to retain talent. But it is better than using very subjective 
performance information to determine special rewards.  
 
Without proper performance appraisal systems the special treatment for 
talent can actually jeopardize morale of employees and organizational 
performance. Talent management has to be an integral part of the performance 
management system and the criteria for assessment must be transparent and 
accepted by employees.  
 
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
Aside from the above competing managerial values, the structure of the 
government is another explanation of the talent management perspective that 
each government has taken. It was observed that the structure of authority of 
responsible agencies is an important factor to explain the scope of talent 
development that each government draws. Thailand’s OCSC and OPDC only 
oversee civil servants in the main line ministries and not government-linked 
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corporations, and independent agencies. Due to the limited rotation 
possibilities, whether officers are on the HiPPS scheme or PSED they normally 
do not have the opportunity to cross-train once in the service. This is very 
different in Singapore, where PSC and PSD, through the whole-of-government 
approach, can provide rotation to many types of public organizations, giving 
AOs ample exposure to difficult tasks including seconment to government-
linked companies.  
 
Another observation is the differing roles of the public training institutions. 
Singapore’s Civil Service College and Malaysia’s INTAN play an integrated role 
to execute training programs. However, this was not witnessed in the case of 
Thailand, where the training for HiPPS and PSED is fragmented between 
OCSC and OPDC. Obviously the mandate of responsible agencies limits what 
they can or cannot do and in turn limits the kind of talent they can train.  
 
Furthermore, another explanation for the lack of opportunities to rotate jobs 
and cross-train is the difference in pay structure between different types of 
organizations. Singapore has solved this problem by setting up a different pay 
scale for AOs that is not tied to where they are posted. For the time being, 
Thailand and Malaysia do not practice this. This creates an obstacle for high 
potential officers on either HiPPS or PTD to be exposed to complex tasks. Their 
salary scales cannot be carried across organizations. Yet, at the same time, it 
has not created an elite super class of civil servants as in the case of Singapore. 
However, looking at the positive side, because of job rotation and good 
exposure of AOs and MAs, Singapore has created a close-knit network of high-
ranking talented civil servants that enables better inter-agency coordination. 
This is something that is lacking in Malaysia and especially Thailand.  
 
The other aspect about salary structure is the linkage with performance 
management system. Singapore has created a system of flexible compensation 
that is linked to performance. This allows for a variety of pay scales for the civil 
service, including those identified as talents. This is not the case in Thailand 
and Malaysia. However, both countries are moving slowly to change the 
compensation rate for civil servants hoping to be comparable to the private 
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sector. This idea has both pros and cons. For those not on the talent scheme 
this separate pay structure might be a demotivating factor. The structure might 
divide the civil service into higher and lower classes. On the other hand, for 
those on the talent scheme, if there is no separate pay structure, they will feel 
unmotivated to take on more difficult tasks (Sadangharn 2010).  
 
Through the interviews of scholars and non-scholars it was confirmed that 
salary is not the only factor for them to stay or leave. This depends on the 
economy; usually in good times people will have more choices. As one 
interviewee said, ‘Because the opportunities in the private sector is not so good, 
so you will actually find good people joining the government during downturns, 
that’s when recruitment gets easier, across the board’ and as another stated, 
‘When the economy in the country picks up, officers leave the service’.  
 
Some stay because of their high level of public service motivation, as one 
person said, ‘My genuine interest is in public policy and for bigger issues, no 
other private organizations can offer me. Since the offer is good and there is 
also no push factor to leave’. Research findings by Putnam (1993) has indicated 
that the level of civic mindedness an individual has correlates to his or her 
performance as a public servant. The key challenge is how to sustain that 
motivation among the identified talents. And to ensure that extra monetary 
incentives do not distort the self-selection pool of talented people who wish to 
join the civil service.  
 
In sum, contextual factors, especially pertaining to how the authority on 
talent management is distributed, the role of training institutions, the salary 
structures, the economy and personal preferences influence the limitations on 
what governments can or cannot do in terms of the design and implementation 
of talent management schemes.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Clearly, the tackling talent crisis in succession of senior leadership roles is at 
the top agenda of these three countries’ talent management policies. Although 
these three countries are within close proximity and have very similar schemes, 
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they fulfill different needs and objectives. Among these three countries, 
Singapore has already a very clear career development roadmap for these 
talents and they were selected right at the beginning even before they enter the 
service. While Malaysia has a stringent assessment system in place, the 
development path of these talents is still being reviewed. Both Malaysia and 
Thailand also recognize that they are unable to pay as well as the private sector 
and so might not attract the best into the service. However, both countries are 
catching up and are reviewing schemes to upgrade the pay as well as improve 
competence of officers currently in-service.  
 
This study has brought up several issues that governments should consider 
when pursuing and developing a talented workforce. Building on existing works 
on exclusiveness and inclusiveness (CPID 2006), in general there are two 
spectrums of approaches. Drawing from the three cases, the authors have 
added features of schemes that would fit into the spectrums. This table is not 
meant to suggest which is more desirable. As discussed through the three 
country cases there are pros and cons to all the approaches. The table is to 
help policy-makers compare various values and approaches and choose the 
most appropriate sets of approaches that best fits their contexts (See table 4). 
Most governments would have a mix set of approaches but the authors suggest 
that it is always better to be clear and conscious of the strategy that one is 
using.  Other actions that are common between the two approaches include 
special training, career roadmaps, and performance-based appraisals. These 




Based on the discussion of context, governments should pay attention to 
certain factors when they design new talent schemes. They include the need 
to:  
1. Give the right level of authority to agencies in charge of the schemes;  
2. Link across public agencies to develop talent;  
3. Link with the private sector to develop talent;  
4. Overcome fix pay structures of the bureaucracy;  
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5. Forecast economic cycles to determine demand and supply of human capital;  
6. Focus on both monetary and non-monetary incentives; 
7. Develop a functioning performance management system.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research on the issues raised in this article would add value to the 
debate on how to best design talent management schemes for the public 
sector. This study is limited to three countries in Asia and uses only qualitative 
methods. For a rigorous comparative analysis, future studies should 
operationalize the suggested competing list of values in talent management 
and compare across many countries. This should be followed by a thorough 
analysis of key variables that can explain the choice of programs, the 
implementation challenges and the set of factors that help lead to success. This 
can be done using quantitative methods. In addition, the non-profit sector also 
suffers from high turnover rate due to the lack of clear career paths and 
competition with the private sector.  There can also be more systemic study to 
capture good practices in the non-profit sector and compare their strategies 
with the public sector. Perhaps there is a general trend to move from an 
inclusive to exclusive approach as the war for talent intensifies. More research 





The article is part of an ongoing research agenda on talent management in 
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Table 1: Overview of the talent management schemes 
 Singapore Malaysia Thailand 
Talent 
Recruitment 
 Open Recruitments 
(fresh-graduates and 
mid-career entrants) 
 Pre-Service bonded 
Scholarships 




 Open Recruitments 
(fresh-graduates and 
mid-career entrants) 




 Recruitments for 
Administrative and 
Diplomatic Service 
 Open Recruitments 
(fresh-graduates) 
 Pre-Service bonded 
Scholarships 
 Public Sector 
Innovation 
Scholarship 






 Allocated training 
hours  
 Roadmaps for 






 High Potential 
Scheme 
 Allocated training 
hours  
 Administrative and 
Diplomatic Scheme 
(PTD) 
 High Performing 
Officer Scheme 
 
 Allocated training 
hours  









 Competitive pegged 
to market pay 
structure 
 Performance-based 
bonus payouts  
 Performance-based 
promotions 
 High pay structure 
for administrative 
officers 
 Base pay coupled 




 Opportunities for 
post-graduate 
studies  
 Fixed pay increment 
structure  
 Fast Stream Track 
 Performance-based 
system 
 Higher pay (about 
1% higher for High 
Potential officers) 














Percentage 20% 60% 10% 10% 
Number of 
Scholarships 
300 900 150 150 
 Source:   Public Service Department, Malaysia, 2010 
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Table 3: Comparisons between key schemes 





strategically targeting top high 
school students, giving them 
proper positions upon return.  
Direct links with development 
and retention strategies: 
special training, fast tracks 
and higher salary.  
Process perspective: quotas 
for students of different 
backgrounds, positioning 
them in key industries 
whether public or private 
sector.  
Some links with 
development and retention: 
special training and special 
tracks.  
HR perspective: public sector 
driven scholarships based on 
organizational needs, no 
specific strategy and target 
group.  
No links with development 
and retention: no special 
training, no fast tracks, and no 
special salary.  
Administrative 
Service (the best 
and brightest)  
Competitive & Development 
perspective: AOs have special 
salary scale, fast promotion 
track and clear career path. 
Special administration for 
these elite bureaucrats.  
Process perspective: PTD 
officers are large in 
numbers, special salary; 
leaders slowly climb up the 
bureaucracy. Lose 
administration for this large 
group of talent.  
HR perspective: 
Administrative service 
scheme does not exist. Most 
leaders simply climb from the 
bottom of the bureaucracy. No 
centralized administration of 





Nominations into MAP and 
HiPo schemes are part of the 
general identification of well 
performers to develop them 
further through extra training.  
Process perspective: well 
performers are identified 
annually and put on the High 
Performers Officers scheme 
and given challenging tasks 
for continuous development.  
Development perspective: 
well performers are identified 
and put on the HiPPS 
scheme, which aims to fast 
track talented individuals 
through challenging tasks and 
extra training.  
 
 
Table 4: Two approaches to talent management 
 
 
Exclusive Approach Inclusive Approach 
Competitive Developmental 
External market In-service employees 
Separate fast track Accelerated promotion 
Separate salary scale Some special pay  
Aggressive targeting Passive targeting 
Concentrated elite class Diffused talented cohort 
Leadership training Management training  
HR as capital to invest in HR as vehicle to enhance equity 
